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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, in that this case was transferred from the Supreme Court.1 The
Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Section 78-2-2(3).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment by ruling that the Plaintiff's claim for defamation was barred
by Section 78-12-29 because the Plaintiff failed to bring his claim within one year
of the occurrence.
A.

Standard of review. The propriety of a trial court's grant of

summary judgment is a question of law. WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv.
Corp.. 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002) and Holmes Dev.. LLC v. Cook. 48 P.3d 895
(Utah 2002). In determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, the
appellate court only reviews whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant
law and whether a material fact was in dispute. ]d. The appellate court reviews
the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, affording them no deference.
Jd.
B.

Preservation of issue. This issue was briefed by the parties

and determined by the trial court in its order granting the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Record, p. 449).

1

Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references shall be to the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended.
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2.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment by ruling that the Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was barred by Section 78-12-29 because the Plaintiff failed to
bring his claim within one year of occurrence.
A.

Standard of review. The propriety of a trial court's grant of

summary judgment is a question of law. WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv.
Corp.. 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002) and Holmes Dev.. LLC v. Cook 48 P.3d 895
(Utah 2002). In determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, the
appellate court only reviews whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant
law and whether a material fact was in dispute. ]d. The appellate court reviews
the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, affording them no deference.
id.
B.

Preservation of issue. This issue was briefed by the parties

and determined by the trial court in its order granting the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Record, p. 449).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendant's Motion For

Summary Judgment by ruling that the Plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy was
barred by Section 78-12-29 because the Plaintiff failed to bring his claim within
one year of the occurrence.
A.

Standard of review. The propriety of a trial court's grant of

summary judgment is a question of law. WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv.
Corp., 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002) and Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook 48 P.3d 895

Robinson Brief on Appeal *** page

2

(Utah 2002). In determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, the
appellate court only reviews whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant
law and whether a material fact was in dispute. ]d. The appellate court reviews
the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, affording them no deference.
]d.
B.

Preservation of issue. This issue was briefed by the parties

and determined by the trial court in its order granting the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Record, p. 449).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

"Section 78-12-29. An action may be brought within one year:
(1)
for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state;
(2)
upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to
an individual and the state, except when the statute imposing it prescribes a
different limitation;
(3)
upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a
forfeiture or penalty to the state;
(4)
for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction;
(5)
against a sheriff or other peace officer for the escape of a prisoner
arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process;
(6)
against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries caused by a
mob or riot;
(7)
on a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a)
Subsection 25-6-5(1), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to four years, under Section 25-6-10; or
(b)
Subsection 25-6-6(2); or,
(8)
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, against a county
legislative body or a county executive to challenge a decision of the county
legislative body or county executive, respectively."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case. The Plaintiff alleges libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and invasion of privacy when someone used an alias "Child
Abuse Helpline and Prevention Center" and blanketed the Plaintiffs
neighborhood and friends with letters stating the Plaintiff was guilty of physical
abuse and molestation of his minor daughters in 1995. The allegations of
physical abuse and molestation were false and caused the Plaintiff substantial
damages. He was required to undergo medical treatment and suffered extreme
humiliation and embarrassment. He became shunned by his neighbors, friends
and church associates. The Plaintiff was unable to determine the identity of the
tortfeasor, his oldest sister, sufficiently to bring a lawsuit, until four months before
the filing of this lawsuit.
Course of proceedings. The Plaintiff brought the instant action in the
Third Judicial District Court on February 14, 2001. (Record, p. 1-6). Following
discovery, the Defendant moved for summary judgment on July 17, 2002.
(Record, p. 173-174). On March 19, 2003, Leon A. Dever, District Court Judge,
granted the Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. Judge Dever issued a
Memorandum Decision dismissing the Plaintiff's claims for libel, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. (Record, p. 449-451 and
Addendum A). He also entered a Judgment of Dismissal With Prejudice on
March 28, 2003. (Record, p. 452-453). The Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on
April 16, 2003. (Record, p. 454-455).
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Disposition below. The trial court dismissed all three of the Plaintiffs
claims for libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.
(Record, p. 449-451 and Addendum A). The trial court concluded that the
Plaintiff's claims were barred under Section 78-12-29 because they were not
brought within one year of the occurrence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Background Facts.
Some background to the present litigation is in order. The Plaintiff and the
Defendant are siblings2 and were, in the past, involved or associated in several
business transactions, also involving the Defendant's husband, Dr. Robert
Morrow. One such association involved a company called Medical Discoveries,
Inc.3 The Defendant was a stockholder in MDI.4 The Defendahf s husband, Dr.
Morrow, conceptualized a hydrolyzing machine that enhanced the body's
immune system. Based upon this conceptualization, the Plaintiff engineered and
built a prototype hydrolyzing machine for him. (Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 88,
Record, 255). Dr. Morrow patented the machine and an Exclusive License
Agreement was entered into between Dr. Morrow and MDI on July 13, 1992, in
exchange for substantial stock. With new majority stockholders, Dr. Morrow

2

The Plaintiff has three older sisters. The Defendant is his oldest sister, followed by Wanda Jo
Smith, and Sandra Jane Harper.
3
MDI was initially created in 1991 by the Defendant and Dr. Morrow. The articles indicate that
the Defendant was an incorporator, initial registered ageht, director, and officer of the corporation.
MDI was subsequently acquired by other stockholders. (Record, p. 314-321).
4
The Defendant had 300,000 share of stock in MDI in her own name. (Deposition of Defendant,
Record, p. 298).
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entered into agreements formally assigning the patents to MDI and agreeing that
he would not compete with the company.
In 1994, MDI learned that Dr. Morrow was allegedly attempting to compete
against MDI. MDI initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Morrow for injunctive relief and
damages in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 940905679.5 MDI was
represented by John Beckstead. During discovery in that case, MDI learned that
Dr. Morrow had contacted the Plaintiff in this action on August 18, 1994, and had
requested the Plaintiff to build him another hydrolyzing Machine, to which the
Plaintiff refused, citing the non-compete agreements, of which the Plaintiff was
aware.
On September 12, 1994, a final pretrial order was entered that identified
the Plaintiff in this action, Daniel L. Robinson, as a witness for MDI. (Deposition
of Plaintiff, p. 92, Record, p. 256). Three days after the Plaintiff was listed as a
witness in the MDI lawsuit, the Defendant wrote a letter to the Defendant and
their father dated September 15, 1994. (Deposition of Defendant, p. 37, Exhibit 2
to Defendant's Deposition, Record, p. 332), Although the letter speaks for itself,
the letter complains that the MDI lawsuit against her husband would cause the
price of the stock to go down.
The Defendant wrote a subsequent letter that complained the Plaintiff was
"fanning the flames" in the MDI lawsuit, that she "know[s] all about this court
case", threatened to go to the "FEDS" or Security Exchange Commission, and
5

The Court may take judicial notice of its own files.
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complained the Plaintiff was "stabbing [her] in the back." (Deposition of
Defendant, p. 39, Exhibit 3 to Defendant's Deposition, Record, 326).
Trial in the MDI lawsuit was scheduled for October 10, 1995, before Judge
Bohling. The Plaintiff was listed as a witness for MDI. (Deposition of Plaintiff, p.
92, Record, p. 256).
B. Facts Related To The Plaintiff's Injury.
On October 5, 1995, letters from the "Child Abuse Helpline and Prevention
Center" blanketed the Plaintiff's neighbors and friends.6 (Deposition of Plaintiff, p.
59-61, Record, p. 248-249). A copy is attached as Addendum B. The letter
states:
"CHILD ABUSE HELPLINE
and PREVENTION CENTER
05 OCTOBER 1995
Dear Community:
It has been reported to our attention that Lizette and Amy Brown, children
of Daniel L. and Amy Brown Robinson, residing at 831 North 1200 West,
Salt Lake City, Utah, then minor children of said parents, were both
physically abused and molested by their step-father.
We operate as a non-descript, innocuous child hotline, helpline and
prevention for the rights of children everywhere. We do not attempt to
notify the courts, nor the clergy. We provide a community effort, much as
the agencies that track down parents who fail in their child support
obligations.
Children often leave home abruptly, at a young age, and much to their
peril. Many times they can never be located and they do not return. If you
see children in this situation, please ask them about abuse, they generally
One was also mailed to the Plaintiff. (Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 92, Record, p. 256).

will not discuss it with strangers, much less other family members.
Thank you.
[Unreadable Signature]"
The contents of the letter were false. (Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 34, Record, p.
242). The letter caused the Plaintiff to suffer serious and substantial emotional
distress. The letter made the Plaintiff sick. (Id., p. 92, Record, p. 256). His
neighbors and friends shunned him. In fact, one neighbor called him and
indicated he was "elected" by neighbors in the area and asked if there was any
truth to the allegations. (Id., p. 62-63, Record, p. 249). He was approached by
others inquiring of the letters. He could not sleep. (Id., p. 42, Record, p. 244).
He was forced to seek professional counseling. (Id.).
C. Facts Related To Plaintiff's Efforts To Determine Identity.
The Plaintiff's immediate suspicion was that the Defendant had written the
letters in an effort to keep him from testifying or destroy his credibility as a
witness in the MDI lawsuit. (Id., p. 93). He also suspected that his ex-wife, Linda
Kim Lessig, may have written the letters as, in the past, they had a turbulent
relationship regarding custody and visitation issues. (Id., p. 110-111, Record, p.
110-111).
He attempted to locate the name of Child Abuse Helpline and Prevention
Center in the phone book and with the telephone company without success. (Id.
p. 95, Record, p. 257). He immediately contacted the police who informed him
that it was a civil matter and they had no jurisdiction. (Id., p. 141, Record, p.
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269). The Plaintiff also complained to the United States Postal Service who gave
him the name of an investigator in Denver to contact. (Id.). The Plaintiff left two
messages on the investigator's phone but the messages were not returned. (Id).
The Plaintiff also took the letters the next week to MDI's attorney, John
Beckstead, during the MDI trial, and asked him to investigate and determine who
had written the letters. (Id., p. 95 Record, p. 257). Subsequently, Mr. Beckstead
provided the Plaintiff with a letter indicating that his office staff had used the
internet, a CD-ROM phone book of the United States, Canada, and South
America, and could not find the organization in question. (Id., p. 104, Record, p.
259).
The Plaintiff also showed the letters to his second sister, Wanda Jo Smith,
on approximately October 25th or 26th, 1995, and asked her if the Defendant had
written the letters. (Id., p. 106, Record, p. 260). Wanda Jo Indicated she would
ask the Defendant if she had authored them. (id.). Sometime thereafter Wanda
Jo informed the Plaintiff that his "sister didn't write those letters." (Id., p. 107,
Record, p. 260).
D. Facts Related To The "Destry Conversation."
In the fall of 1997, the Defendant's son, Destry Brady, a minor, was
visiting the Plaintiffs home. (Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 112, Record, 261).
During the visit, Destry "blurted it out that every time the family gets together they
talk about the letters and, mom, why did you write them?", (jd.). There is no
evidence as to the Defendant's response to the question posited by her family.

The Plaintiff also doubted that Destry would be a credible witness. He was not
living at home when the above statement was made, had adopted a "counterculture lifestyle", and was believed by the Plaintiff to be a user of illegal drugs.
(Affidavit of Plaintiff, Record, p. 224). Moreover, Destry had been evicted from
the Defendant's house for allegedly taking money. (Id.). Indeed, Destry Brady
denied this conversation after this litigation arose. (Record, p. 199-200).
Therefore, given these circumstances, the Plaintiff believed he lacked credible
evidence to file any action against the Defendant at that time.7
E. Facts Related To Defendant's Admission To Sister Wanda Jo Smith.
In between LDS general conference sessions in October, 2000, the
Plaintiff had two conversations with his sister, Wanda Jo Smith, regarding family
matters. (Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 117, Record, 263). In each of these
conversations, Wanda Jo Smith told the Plaintiff that the Defendant admitted to
her that she authored the letters. (Id). The Plaintiff tape recorded the second
conversation that occurred on October 15, 2000.8 (Id., p. 119, Record, 263).
Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff contacted an attorney and this litigation was
commenced on February 14, 2001.
F. Facts Related To Deposition of Wanda Jo Smith.
On May 15, 2002, the Plaintiff provided notice for the taking of the
deposition of Wanda Jo Smith for Thursday, June 6, 2002, at 10:00 a.m.
7

The Defendant also denied that she told family members that she was responsible for the
letters. (Deposition of Defendant, p. 58, Record, p. 304).
8
A copy of the transcript is attached to the Affidavit of Plaintiff, Exhibit A, Record, p. 226-231.
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(Record, p. 171-172). On Saturday, May 25, 2002, Wanda Jo Smith met with the
Defendant and her husband, Dr. Morrow, and a third sister, Sandra Jane Harper
and her husband, Rock Harper. (Deposition of Wanda Jo Smith, p. 24-34,
Record, p. 347). The meeting occurred in Huntsville, Utah at the Harper
residence and lasted two hours. (Id.). At that time, they all went over a copy of
the transcript of the October 15, 2000 taped conversation and discussed it in
detail. (Id.). The Defendant had a copy of the transcript. (Id, p. 26, Record, p.
347). Subsequently, Wanda Jo Smith met with the Defendant's attorney, Ron
Barker, on June 1, 2002, and independently obtained a copy of the transcript of
the October 15, 2002 conversation. (Id., p. 33, Record, p. 349). Ms. Smith also
had a scheduled luncheon with Dr. Morrow on June 6, 2002, immediately
following her deposition. (Id., p. 17-18, Record, p. 345).
During the deposition of Wanda Jo Smith on June 6, 2003, she admitted
that she had several conversations with the Defendant over long periods of time
about the letters in question in this case. (Deposition of Wanda Jo Smith, p. 40,
Record, p. 351). Also, at first, she initially confirmed that the Defendant had told
her that the Defendant authored the letters but then retracted her testimony:
"Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did you ask her if she authored these letters?
No.
Did she tell you that she authored these letters?
Yes.
And when did she tell you that?
Well, she—no, she didn't tell me that, I'm sorry. I told Dan that.
She did not tell me that.

Q.

Are you retracting that answer at this point in time.

A.

Yes."

(Deposition of Wanda Jo Smith, p. 41, Record, p. 351).
Wanda Jo Smith admitted in her deposition that she had, in fact, talked to
the Plaintiff on October 15, 2000, when the conversation was taped. (Id., p. 46,
Record, p. 352). She testified that she told the Plaintiff that the Defendant had
admitted she was responsible for the writing of the letters in question. (Id., p. 50
and 54, Record, 353 and 354). She attempted to explain her taped conversation
of October 15, 2000 by stating that she had lied to the Plaintiff in that
conversation about what the Defendant had told her. (Id). Her explanation was
hardly credible in light of the fact she was aware that the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit
based upon her October 15, 2000 conversation with the Plaintiff but never told
him, or anyone else, it was a lie until she was questioned in her deposition on
June 6, 2002. (Id., p. 51, Record, p. 354). Her explanation also fails rationality
where she met with the Defendant and others 11 days prior to her deposition and
went over a copy of the transcript of the taped conversation.9
Subsequent to the deposition of Wanda Jo Smith, she had a conversation
with her 80 year old father, Lawrence "Bud" LeRoy Robinson on October 6, 2002.
(Affidavit of Lawrence Robinson, Record, p. 405-408). During that conversation,
Wanda Jo Smith told him, "Waunita should never have sent out those letters."
9

If she had lied to the Plaintiff about what the Defendant told her, one must ask why she didn't
immediately tell the Plaintiff, or someone, it was a lie when he filed the lawsuit. Why did she
travel to Huntsville on May 25th to go over the transcript if it were a lie? And, if she determined
the alleged lie was clearly set forth in the transcript, why didn't she immediately tell someone
instead of being deposed?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment and dismissing the
Plaintiffs case because he was untimely in bringing his action for libel, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. He argues that he was
unable to discover competent evidence upon which to bring his action until after
the lapse of the limitations period and that any delay was equitably tolled by the
Defendant's concealment of her identity in the authorship of the offending letters.
The Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the trial court and remand the case
for trial.
ARGUMENT
Point One
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND FINDING THE PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
LIBEL WAS BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-29.
The trial court ruled that the Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for libel was
barred by Utah's one-year statute of limitations found in Section 78-12-29(4).
The trial court's brief reasoning was:
"...the plaintiff knew or had expressed a belief that the offending letter
was written by the defendant as early as October 1995. Plaintiff also
stated that he received information in the fall of 1997 that the defendant
had written the offending letter. This action was not filed until February
13, 2001. Statute of limitations for an action for libel is one year. Even
if the Court accepts the argument that the time should run from when the
Plaintiff had reason to believe the defendant was the author, the Plaintiffs
deposition testimony establish that he received confirmation of his
suspicions in the fall of 1997."

Robinson Brief on Aooeal *** twp 1"?

(Record, p. 449-451 and Addendum A). The Plaintiff respectfully argues that the
trial court's decision was flawed and requires a reversal.
The trial court misapplied the discovery rule. The discovery rule applies
to actions for libel. The running of Utah's limitations statute for libel is tolled until
the Plaintiff discovers, or reasonably could have discovered, that the Defendant
was the source of the offending letters. Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah
1990). In Allen, the alleged defamatory statements arose from letters sent
between private individuals that alleged sexual abuse. The Plaintiff did not
discover the source within the statutory period. The Utah Supreme Court
excused the delay citing the discovery rule:
"We think that the policy behind the discovery rule, that potential plaintiffs
should not be barred from suit if they did not know and could not
reasonably have known of the underlying facts giving rise to a cause of
action, appropriately applies to libel actions. Unlike cases involving a
direct injury to the person, a libel may remain unknown for years, all the
while having its effect on one's reputation. We therefore hold that in
libel cases, the one-year period of section 78-12-29(4) does not begin to
run until the libel is known or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff.
Whether plaintiffs knew or should have known of the letter to the mayor
is a question of fact to be determined on remand."
Generally, a cause of action accrues "upon the happening of the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,
86 (Utah 1981) (knowledge that guardian's ward had been killed). Under the
discovery rule, the period of limitations is tolled until the "discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action." Id., p. 86.
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In the present case, the issue was not over discovering the libelous
material because that was immediately known. The issue was one of
discovering the identity of the tortfeasor who was responsible for writing the
libelous letters and distributing them. The Plaintiff immediately took reasonable
steps to identify the tortfeasor. He reported the incident to the police as well as
to the United States Postal Service, seeking assistance. He also engaged the
services of an attorney in an effort to identify the tortfeasor. All of these efforts
were unavailing.
While the Plaintiff suspected the Defendant, the Defendant denied writing
the letters in question. Therefore, in order to properly bring a lawsuit against the
Defendant, the Plaintiff was required to obtain at least some competent evidence
that the Defendant was, in fact, the tortfeasor. His suspicions alone were
inadequate. Without some competent evidence, a lawsuit would have been
subject to immediate dismissal and the Plaintiff and his counsel would have been
subject to sanctions under Rule 11 U.R.C.P.

Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d. 1021

(Utah 2000). In Morse, an action for slander, the Court imposed sanctions upon
the plaintiff for making an allegation of fact in his complaint that subsequently had
no evidentiary support. The allegation involved a critical fact. The court held,
citing 2 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, §11.11 [2][a], "Rule 11
places an affirmative duty on attorney's and litigants to make reasonable
investigation (under the circumstances) of the facts and the law before signing
and submitting any pleading...." Morse, supra, p. 1028. And, While

Robinson Brief on Appeal *** page 15

misstatements of insignificant facts may be excused, uninvestigated and
unsupported "critical" allegations in pleadings are subject to the rule. ]d.
Under the Morse standard, the most critical fact in this case was whether
the Defendant wrote and distributed the letters. Therefore, the Plaintiff could not
have filed an action based upon his mere suspicions. He required some
competent evidence upon which to base the critical allegation of identify, i.e.,
who was the tortfeasor. That evidence came on October 15, 2000, when Wanda
Jo Smith told the Plaintiff that the Defendant admitted to her she was responsible
for the letters.10 The present lawsuit against the Defendant, filed on February 14,
2001, was well within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 7812-29.
The trial court's focus on the "Destry Conversation" Was factually wrong.
While the Plaintiff got confirmation of his suspicions, he lacked any evidence
upon which to base a complaint using the Morse standard. There was no
admission in the Destry Brady conversation that the Defendant admitted she was
responsible for the letters. The Plaintiff testified regarding this conversation at
length and testified that Destry Brady "blurted it out that every time the family
gets together they talk about the letters and, mom, why did you write them?"

10

An "admission" is a voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the existence of truth of
certain facts that are inconsistent with the party's claim in an action and therefore amounts to
proof against the party. 29 Am. Jur. 2d., Evidence, § 599. In Utah, admissions by a partyopponent are competent evidence under Rule 801(d)(2) U.R.E. and carry considerable weight.
For example, under Utah law, a litigant is not required to prove the truth of facts admitted by an
adversary. Garland v. Fleishman, 831 P.2d 111 (1992).
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(Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 112, Record, 261). There is no evidence in this
conversation that his mother, the Defendant here, admitted she wrote the letters.
Destry's comment, therefore, could not have served as an evidentiary basis for
making the allegation that the Defendant was the author of the letters. And,
given the nature of the circumstances surrounding Destry Brady at the time, his
limited testimony would also have suffered severe credibility issues. Accordingly,
the trial court erred when it concluded that the application of the discovery rule
would have started the clock to run after the Destry Conversation.
The few courts that have addressed the identity issue have applied the
doctrine of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescription (prescription does
not run against one who is unable to act) or ruled that the accrual date of a cause
of action is delayed until the plaintiff is not only aware of an injury but also its
negligent cause. In Herdman v. Smith. 707 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying
Louisiana law), the plaintiff was viciously attacked by an unknown assailant.
Under Louisiana statutes, he was required to bring his action within one year.
After two years, a witness came forward and identified the defendant as the one
who attacked the plaintiff. The court tolled the limitations period by applying the
doctrine of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescription where there was
evidence that the Plaintiff actively sought the defendant's identity but it was
concealed.
Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California. 873 P.2d 440 (Cal.
1994), a libel case, contains facts very similar to the present action. There, a
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highly critical dossier was published and circulated exposing the plaintiff, a city
councilman, to alleged libelous matters. Nothing in the document identified its
author, sponsor or distributor. Although the plaintiff used diligence in attempting
to determine the identity of the torfeasor, he was unable to do so within
California's limitations statute. After the statute had run, the plaintiff discovered
the responsible author and brought suit. The trial court dismissed holding that
the statute began to run upon discovery of the injury and not upon the discovery
of the torfeasor. The California Supreme Court, en bank, reversed the trial court
and ruled that the anonymous drafting and circulation of the dossier constituted
intentional concealment and tolled the running of the statute. The court found
that a defendant should not be able to profit by his or her own wrong:
"May a thief, for example, who leaves no clues to his identify defeat an
action by the rightful owner to recover the stolen property if the owner
fails to find and serve the culprit within the applicable limitations period?
Should the anonymous perpetrator of an assault and battery be immune
from the victim's civil damage action after the time for identifying and
serving Doe defendants has been exhausted. Or alternately, should the
defendants in these circumstances be estopped from capitalizing upon
their own misconduct under an equitable rule, akin to the rule of
fraudulent concealment, which would toll the statute until the plaintiff
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the defendant's identity?'
]d., at 444. Also, see Spitler v. Dean. 436 N.W. 2d 308 (Wis. 1989) where the
court specifically held that, under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations is
tolled until the identify of the tortfeasor is determined. Cf. Foil v. Ballinger 601
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) (knowledge of causation, and not mere injury itself,
commences period of limitations to start).
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The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that fraudulent concealment tolls the
expiration of a limitations statute in a fraud action. Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271
(Utah 2001). Also see Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996). While this
is not a fraud action, the same principle applies.11 Here, the Defendant
concealed her identity as the author of the letters in question beyond the
limitations period and the Plaintiff did not discover her identity despite his
reasonable attempts to do so. The Defendant should not be able to profit from
her own wrongdoing.
In conclusion on this point, the Plaintiff respectfully submits that Section
78-12-29 should be equitably tolled until the Plaintiff discovered, or should have
discovered, the true identify of who authored the letters in question. The Plaintiff
submits that the trial court erred in dismissing his First Cause of Action.

Point Two
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND FINDING THE PLAINTIFF'S SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WAS BARRED BY SECTION 78*12-29.
The Trial Court ruled that the Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, a claim
for emotional distress, was based upon the libelous letters in question and

The Utah Supreme Court also held that "close calls" regarding the application of the discovery
rule are for the juries, and not judges, to make. ]d., p. 1276. Here, the Plaintiff made the same
argument below that was rejected by the trial court. (Record, p. 217-218).
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therefore should be dismissed as well. (Record, p. 449-450 and Addendum A).
The Trial court erred.
Causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion
of privacy are separate and distinct causes of action from defamation cases and
therefore are not "subsumed" within the defamation action. Russell v. Thompson
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905-906 (Utah 1992). Limitation periods for this
tort begin to run when the cause of action is complete. Retherford v. AT & T
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992). Claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress are governed by Utah's four year statute, Section 78-1225(3). Retherford, supra, p. 975.
As argued under Point One above, the Plaintiff suspected the Defendant
was responsible for his injuries. However, he had no evidence upon which to
base an allegation in a complaint that the Defendant was the person responsible
for his emotional distress claims until October 15, 2000, wheh he was informed of
the Defendant's admission through his sister, Wanda Jo Smith. His cause of
action was not complete until he had evidence sufficient to file a complaint
identifying the Defendant as the tortfeasor. Retherford, supra. The filing of this
action on February 14, 2001, was clearly within the four-year period.
Even if one accepts the trial court's logic that the Destry Conversation in
the fall of 1997 triggered the time clock, the filing of this action on February 14,
2001, was within the four-year limitations period.
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Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff's claim for
intentional infliction of emotion distress.
Point Three
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND FINDING THE PLAINTIFFS THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
INVASION OF PRIVACY WAS BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-29.
The trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action, alleging
invasion of privacy for the same reasons it dismissed the Plaintiff's Second
Cause of Action, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Record, p.
449-450). For the same reasons set forth under Point Two above, the trial court
erred. The limitation period for the tort of invasion of privacy is governed by the
residual provision found Section 78-12-25(3). This limitations statute requires an
action being filed within four years.12 It is not subsumed into the libel action.
Russell supra. The Plaintiff could not file his action for invasion of privacy until
he had some evidence to support the allegation that the Defendant was
responsible. This occurred on October 15, 2000. Even if one applies the trial
court's logic that the Destry Conversation triggered the statute, the Plaintiff filed
the present action within the four-year period.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court erred in granting the
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and dismissing his Complaint
12

The tort of invasion of privacy is not specifically enumerated in any statute of limitation.
Therefore, Utah's residual statute of four years applies. Hodges v. Howell. 4 P.3d 803 (Ut. App.
2000) (and cases cited therein).
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because he failed to bring his action timely. The Plaintiff requests that this Court
reverse the trial court and remand the case for trial.
DATED this

/f

day of September, 2003.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says:
That he is the attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant herein; and that he served
two copies of the attached APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL upon:
Clifford J. Payne
Nelson, Chipman, Quigley & Hansen
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by hand delivering a true and correct copy thereof on the f%™ day of
September, 2003.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this l ^ d a v of September, 2003.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL L ROBINSON
Plaintiff,
vs.

WAUNITA MORROW
Defendant.

:

Order

:

Case No. 010901436 Ml

:

Judge L. A. Dever

:
:

This matter came on for hearing before L. A. Dever, Judge of the Third District Court on
January 17, 2003. Counsel for the plaintiff and defendant were present.
The Court has considered the memoranda and the arguments of counsel. The
undisputed facts, presented by the plaintiff, establish that the plaintiff knew or had expressed a
belief that the offending letter was written by the defendant as early as October 1995. Plaintiff
also stated that he received information in the fall of 1997 that the defendant had written the
offending letter. This action was not filed until February 13, 2001. Statute of Limitations for an
action for libel is one year. Even if the Court accepts the argument that the time should run
from when the Plaintiff had reason to believe the defendant was the author, the Plaintiff's
deposition testimony establish that he received confirmation of his suspicions in the fall of 1997.
Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiff's causes of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy are based on the libelous letter

and therefore likewise dismissed.
Dated this 17 day of March, 2003.
BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed/delivered on this
/ /

day of March, 2003, to the following:

Clifford J. Payne
215 South State St, Ste 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Stephen W. Cook
323 South 600 East, Ste 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

VKJ
)eputy Court Clerk

ADDENDUM B

CHILD ABUSE HELPLINE
and PREVENTION CENTER

05 OCTOBER 1995
Dear Community:
It has been reported to our attention that Lizette and Amy Brown, children of
Daniel L. and Amy Brown Robinson, residing at 831 North 1200 West, Salt
Lake City, Utah, then minor children of said parents, were both physically
abused and molested by their step-father.
We operate as a non-descript, innocuous child hotline, helpline and
prevention for the rights of children everywhere. We do not attempt to notify
the courts, nor the clergy. We provide a community effort, much as the
agencies that track down parents who fail in their child support obligations.
Children often leave home abruptly, at a young age, and much to their peril.
Many times they can never be located and they do not return. If you see
children in this situation, please ask them about abuse, they generally will not
discuss it with strangers, much less other family members. Thank you.

